Town madrasah, widely viewed as a jihadist alma mater that fanned anti-Shi'ite violence. 9 He is a member of the Mengal tribe whose members have played a prominent role in longstanding militant and mainstream Balochi efforts to achieve greater autonomy for Balochistan. So is Akhtar Mengal, a provincial lawmaker and former chief minister of Balochistan who endorsed assertions that his namesake is a violent militant. "Wherever you find missing persons in Baluchistan, you find Shafiq Mengal," Mengal told The New York Times. 10 Amid an increasing number of incidents in Balochistan, Pakistani security sources asserted in June 2017 that political violence in the districts of Wadh, Mastung, and Jhal Magsi, some of Pakistan's most heavily securitized regions, could only be countered by neutralizing Shafiq Mengal. 11 The violence in the area became a matter of urgency in October 2017 after two Chinese nationals were kidnapped in Mastung and murdered. 12 The security sources spoke to Pakistani media after Sindh Province's Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) warned, in a letter to the interior ministry, that Sipahe-Sahaba and its violent, secretive offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or Army of Jhangvi, constituted a major security threat. 13 Three years later, elections in the 2018 polling were cancelled in Mastung's PB-35 district after 55-year-old Siraj Raisani, the leader of the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), was killed alongside 149 others in a bombing of a campaign rally that was claimed by the Islamic State as well as the Taliban.
It was Pakistan's second worst incident of political violence. 14 Police said the suicide bomber, the scion of a militant family, had radicalized while studying at a madrasah in Karachi funded by sources in Saudi Arabia. His sisters were married to Islamic State operatives in Afghanistan. 15 Other members of the family moved to areas in Afghanistan controlled by the Islamic State. It was unclear whether the Saudi funds originated from within the government or came from private donors with or without tacit government approval. The madrasah, Siddiquia, was one of 94 mostly Saudi-backed religious seminaries in the city and Sindh province that were under surveillance because they had produced jihadis and perpetrators of attacks, according to Pervez Ahmed Chandio, the head of Karachi's counterterrorism department. 16 With the bombing, Balochistan's vicious cycle of violence had caught up with Raisani, seven years after he defied a warning by Balochistan separatists not to attend a soccer tournament in Mastung's Shaheed Nauroz Football Stadium. Raisani, who was known for his close ties to the military, escaped when he was attacked with hand grenades during the tournament's final, but his son was one of two people killed. 17 Populated by what prominent Baloch journalist Malik Siraj Akbar described as "proIslamabad tribal notables and self-identified electable leaders," BAP, which was established only four months prior to the July election, backed the military's policy in the region and was critical of Baloch nationalists who wanted to wrest control of Balochistan's resources from the central government and the military. 18 In a demonstration of the BAP's relationship with the armed forces, Lt. Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan's top military commander, flew to Balochistan to attend Raisani's funeral. 19 The attack on Raisani's rally, the latest in a series of assaults on civilian and military targets in Balochistan, highlighted the risks involved in the military's use of militant proxies against both Baloch nationalists and India. This risk has been further highlighted by the fact that the military has sought to counter the violence by killing militant leaders, creating a vicious tit-for-tat cycle in the process.
Pakistani journalist Zahid Gishkori calculated that around 1,050 people were killed and 1,570 others were injured in 52 major incidents of political violence in the province over the past 12 years. 20
Time of Reckoning
The vicious circle of violence suggests that the military's effort to ease militants into mainstream Pakistani politics can only succeed if the military drops its selective support of militant violence and ensures that militants-turned-politicians sever their ties to extremism. A series of attacks on at least 12 girls' schools in Gilgit-Baltistan barely two weeks after populist Imran Khan won the 2018 election demonstrated the breadth of the problem. 21 "There remains a violent extremism embedded in communities across Pakistan that needs to be forthrightly addressed," Dawn, Pakistan's foremost English-language newspaper, said in an editorial. 22 The roots of the extremism problem date to the immediate wake of the 1947 partition of British India when militants were used as proxies to compensate for Pakistan's economic and military weakness.
Militants were "the first elements of Pakistan's foreign and defense policy," said Pakistani scholar Arif Jamal. 23 "The Pakistan-militant nexus is as old as the Pakistani state. From its founding in 1947 to the present day, Pakistan has used religiously motivated militant forces as strategic tools …. [They are] the centrepiece of a sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign, painstakingly developed and prosecuted since Pakistan's founding …. Supporting jihad has been one of the principal means by which the Pakistani state has sought to produce security for itself," added national security expert S.
Paul Kapur and political scientist Sumit Ganguly. 24 The Pakistani military's support for militants fits a pattern adopted by countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In some ways, it was an early expression of a lack of confidence in the reliability of the United States as an ally that spurred greater assertiveness of US allies in the Gulf starting with the ascent of Barak Obama to the presidency. The military's ambivalence toward the United States, grounded in a perception that the United States had repeatedly abandoned Pakistan, was evident when senior army corps commanders resisted post 9/11 cooperation in the war on terror because it would endanger the country's national security. 25 Pakistan's military brass, years into a tenuous cooperation with the United States, believed that it, together with Indian and Afghan support for anti-state jihadists and Baloch separatists, was the trigger for mounting domestic political violence.
Columnist Zahid Hussain thundered in an article in Dawn entitled "Conspiratorial Paranoia" that "it is about time we came out of this dangerous delusion of being victims of some foreign conspiracy.
These are our own people who are blowing up our schools, homes and religious places. Thousands of Pakistani soldiers have been killed battling the groups which were once developed as security assets. These groups have now turned to jihad inside. Defying the bans on them, they are not only still active, but have also expanded. They are certainly not outsiders but home-grown militants trying to impose their retrogressive worldview through force." 26 Pakistani military distrust of the United States was, however, too deeply rooted in its definition of the keys to Pakistani national security to heed Hussain's outcry. It saw the country's security defined by a need to undermine Indian regional hegemony, gain control of Indian-administered Kashmir, and ensure that Afghanistan was governed by forces friendly to Pakistan. Fear, a sense of encirclement by India and Afghanistan, and Pakistan's inherent weakness drove the military's perception of national security. "The collective mental archive of Pakistani nationalism has always tagged India as the arch-enemy in a zero-sum battle with Pakistan. The US and Israel are the new ingredients in this national prescription. The problem is that no one in the world agrees with it. Last time it happened, in 1971, we lost East Pakistan. There are no exceptions to this paranoid consensus. The chemistry of surrender is at work and the only smell striking the nostrils is that of fear," charged prominent Pakistani journalist and author Khaled Ahmed. 27 The anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan that defeated and forced a superpower to withdraw became the model for Pakistani efforts to recapture Kashmir 28 and ensure that it was a dominant player in postSoviet Afghanistan. To achieve those goals, Pakistani intelligence employed ultra-conservative militants in the 1990s to transform an indigenous insurgency seeking to achieve independence of 24 The Pakistani effort spotlighted the fact that militancy was woven into the fabric of the Pakistani state and society. Like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan promoted Islam at home, empowered its religious establishment, included religious leaders in the power structure, and sought to direct Islamists and jihadists toward the country's foreign enemies. Countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia promoted militants "to counter external threats, undermine geopolitical competitors, boost domestic legitimacy, and reorient challengers' focus to outside the country's borders," said Stephen Tankel, the counterterrorism scholar. 29 In the early days of independence, Pakistan already saw Islam and the nourishing of an Afghan Islamist movement as a way to redress a regional balance in which it saw itself encircled by India and "Since the 1970s, when Pakistan Studies was introduced as a compulsory subject in schools and colleges, it is the distorted and sectarian version of history that is fed to the overwhelming majority of children and youth who are not privileged to travel the O and A level road. During the decade of Mohammed Zia ul Haq's rule the trend toward the sectarianizing the educational system advanced to the point that Sunni and Shia were assigned separate Islamiyat syllabus, a practice which continues today," said political scientist Eqbal Ahmad. 33 Ultra-conservatism and associated militants provided Pakistan, groping for a cohesive national identity, with a badly needed narrative that would provide the glue to bind its multiple Muslim sects, religious minorities, and ethnic groups, as well as both its indigenous population and the millions of muhajirs, Muslim immigrants from what had become India. That was no truer than in the wake of the 1971 war with India that gave birth to Bangladesh, a war that was fought conventionally. Muslim identity that united the faithful of all stripes but also reinforced the military's belief in the utility of militants as proxies.
As a result, Pakistan "has failed to crack down on terrorist activity at home and encouraged its citizens to adopt views that may make them more receptive to extremist positions. Pakistan has continued to insist … that only a renewed national commitment to Islam will be able to unite the disparate ethnic groups, tribes, and minorities that coexist within the country. These views are taken to the extreme by Islamic militants, who seek to destroy India altogether and to turn Pakistan into a sharia state governed exclusively by Islamic law," said author and journalist Ahmed Rashid. 34 The country's Inter-Services Intelligence agency, added Lashkar-e-Taiba expert Samina Yasmeen, "selected diverse religious-based organizations in Pakistan to be trained on the Afghan front and then to develop sufficient capacity to shape the future directions of the Kashmiri independence movement." 35 The military is likely to come under increased pressure to rethink its approach toward militants as prime minister Khan struggles to resolve his country's economic and financial crisis by possibly seeking a US$12 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and reinforcing antimoney laundering and terrorism finance measures to avoid being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog. 36 Similarly, Khan, who earned the nickname Taliban Khan, is likely to have to counter his past record of allowing government funds to go to militant madrasahs, his advocacy for the opening in Pakistan of an official Taliban Pakistan office, 37 and his support of the Afghan Taliban. 38 In February 2018, his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) headed government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa gave $2.5 million to Darul Aloom Haqqania, a militant religious seminary. 39 Dubbed a "jihad university," 40 Darul Aloom
Haqqania is headed by Sami ul-Haq, a hard-line Islamist politician known as the father of the Taliban. The university's alumni also include Mullah Omar, the deceased leader of the Taliban, Jalaluddin Haqqani, the head of the Haqqani Network, Asim Umar, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, Mullah Omar's successor who was killed in a 2016 US drone strike. 41 The provincial government also removed "objectionable material" from schoolbooks, such as pictures of young girls with their hair uncovered, Christmas cakes and crosses rather than crescents on ambulances, and the phrase Good Morning instead of Assalamu Aliakum or Peace Be Upon You.
The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party that had complained about the content of schoolbooks said the deleted material would be replaced by content proposed by the party. 42 Khan's defense of the Taliban years ago we were in this for dollars again, acting as a frontline state. We were creating jihadis for dollars then and now we are taking dollars to kill the same people." 46 Khan's remarks were as applicable to the Pakistani military that has backed him in recent years as they were to many among the country's political elite whom he views as corrupt.
Taking issue with Khan's assertion that militancy in Pakistan was the result of the United States' illconceived war on terror rather than a history of support of militant proxies that is written into the country's DNA, Sana Bucha, a prominent Pakistani television anchor suggested that by portraying the country's politicians as having bought into it because of the US funding that it garnered, Khan was, in effect, doing the military's bidding. "These jihadists supported by the I.S.I. were in Kashmir well before 9/11. And why does Imran blame Zardari for the drone attacks when everyone knows that the president has no power and the military gave the Americans permission to use the drones? It is because the military and intelligence agencies are backing Imran," Bucha said, referring to InterServices Intelligence, Pakistan's main intelligence service, by its initials and former Pakistani president Asef Ali Zardari. 47 Khan's line of argument is also one that fits the ultra-conservative Muslim agenda, according to South Asian scholar Ahsan I. Butt. "If terrorism is not indigenous to Pakistan, and merely imported, then it follows that no larger reckoning of the state's and society's relationship with religion can or should take place -a convenient conclusion for religious hardliners," Butt said. 48 Khan may well owe his electoral victory in part to the military but appears to have an ambivalent If Khan is a potentially loose cannon from the military's perspective, his electoral victory, his ultraconservatism notwithstanding, fits a global trend toward populism and nationalism. It expresses voters' loss of confidence in traditional politicians and anger at mismanagement and corruption, and, in the case of Pakistan, with dynastic politics. Khan "is neither a Bhutto nor a Sharif, and this is significant for a country where civilian political power has alternated between these two clans throughout the 1990s and well into the twenty-first century," said Saloni Kapur, a doctoral student whose research focuses on the impact of the international community on Pakistan's internal security.
In defeating Pakistan's political dynasties, Khan's interests were aligned with those of the military.
Kapur takes the optimistic view on Khan's rise by arguing that his "victory is a democratising event that indicates that power can no longer be the closely guarded prerogative of a tiny military-political elite, but that new actors are finding their voice, and social control is being dispersed. February 2018 to put Pakistan on a grey list with a warning that it could be blacklisted if it failed to demonstrate compliance. 55 To demonstrate its sincerity, Pakistan, in advance of the July election, passed the Anti-Terrorism
Ordinance of 2018, giving groups and individuals, including Saeed, designated by the United Nations as international terrorists the same status in Pakistan for the first time. 56 At the same time, it sought to curtail the ability of Saeed's organisations to perform social and charity work, a pillar of their popularity, by confiscating ambulances operated by his charity, the Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation,
closing Jamaat-ud-Dawa offices, and handing control of its madrasahs to provincial governments. 57 Lashkar-e-Taiba was both a militant group focused on waging a violent jihad that would undermine
Indian control of parts of Kashmir and an ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim missionary group whose madrasahs served not only as recruitment grounds but as vehicles for the transformation of Pakistan into a Shari'ah-based state. "The provocative texts it publishes and the textbooks it assigns in schools offer a strictly sectarian interpretation of the Qur'an and testify to the group's strong belief in jihadist violence," said journalist Rashid. 58 Lashkar-e-Taiba's utility as a proxy in the dispute over Kashmir, missionary ambitions, and original roots in the Saudi-backed Jamaat Ulema-e-Ahl-e-Hadith (Society of the Islamic Scholars of the People of the Traditions of the Prophet) ensured that it had funding from both the Pakistani military as well as the kingdom. It ensured grassroots support by creating an efficient social welfare operation that could compete with the government's healthcare system. However, the group's relationship to Saudi Arabia, where several of its leaders, including Saeed, had studied and built ties to private and government NGOs as well as the Pakistani diaspora was complicated by the fact that it defined jihad primarily as a military obligation rather than a spiritual struggle within oneself against sin and to improve society and only secondarily as defensive warfare if and when the faith was attacked. 59 Counterterrorism scholar Stephen Tankel estimated that, in 2009, Jamaat-ud-Dawa operated 173
madrasahs with an estimated 20,000 students across the country. The madrasahs' curriculum put as much emphasis on information technology as it did on concepts of jihad, 60 and it was taught by teachers who had participated in military operations. 61 Jamaat-ud Dawa operated six hospitals, including one in Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, 143 medical facilities in often underserved, remote areas of the country, and Pakistan's second largest fleet of ambulances. 62 The group was at the forefront of providing effective emergency relief in the wake of the devastating 2005 earthquake. Its field hospitals were well-stocked and equipped with X-ray machines, a dental facility, and a makeshift operating theatre. Keen to reap public relations benefits, the group ensured that journalists had proper access. 63 The group similarly distributed food, medicine, and cash to hundreds of thousands affected by floods in 2010. 64 "What Pakistanis saw in terms of its public behaviour was not militancy as much as social work and religious activism," Tankel noted. 65 The fact that Saeed's candidates and other militants did not bag National Assembly seats in the July 2018 election would, at first glance, suggest that it would be easier for the military to radically alter its approach to extremism. That, however, ignores the significance of their capturing almost ten per cent of the vote 66 The militants benefitted whether or not they made it into either a provincial or the national assembly.
Scholar Aasim Sajjad Akhtar argues that Pakistan's religious right, including militants attempting to enter mainstream politics, want a share of Pakistan's patronage-based power pie. In Akhtar's view, the effort constitutes a successful way for the disenfranchised to carve out a stake for themselves by ensuring that they have a place in status quo politics. 72 Khan's ultra-conservative attitudes were also reflected in the first actions of the PTI's provincial culture and information minister in Punjab, Fayyazul Hassan Chohan, who ordered a province-wide ban on "vulgar" and "indecent" film posters displayed inside and outside cinema houses. 92 95 Sardar also successfully sponsored a resolution in parliament revoking a decision by Islamabad's Quaid-i-Azam University to rename its physics department in honour of Abdus Salam, a winner of the Nobel Prize for Physics, because he was an Ahmadi. 96 More than two decades ago, former prime minister Raja Pervez Ashraf boasted at a Pakistan People's Party (PPP) about how his party had broken "the neck of Qadianis" (a derogatory term for Ahmadis). 97 The blurred lines between non-violent religious extremism and violent militancy were evident when, in May 2018, a gunman associated with TLP shot and wounded the then-interior minister Ahsan Iqbal because of his allegedly lax attitude toward the Khatam-i-Nabuwwat principle. TLP condemned the shooting. 98 Similarly, in a tell-tale sign, the bombing of Raisani's election rally in Balochistan failed to prompt mainstream parties to demand strict implementation of Pakistan's anti-terrorism National Action Plan adopted in 2015 and to reform and affirm regulation of the country's religious seminaries.
By the same token, the long-ruling PML-N's close ties with militants were put on public display when ASWJ's alliance with ousted prime minister Nawaz Sharif's party was brokered almost a decade ago by senior PML-N politician and then-provincial law minister Rana Sanaullah Khan who campaigned together with Ludhianvi in a 2010 Punjab by-election. 102 The two men struck a deal by which ASWJ would support PML-N and allow its members to run for office on the party's ticket and ensure that the Punjab provincial government headed by Sharif's brother, Shahbaz, would not prosecute ASWJ operatives despite pressure from federal authorities. In exchange, the militants would provide the party with physical muscle. 103 In February 2010, Sanaullah cemented the alliance by visiting the graves of Maulana Haq Nawaz
Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba's founder, and Azam Tariq, one of its other murdered leaders who were buried alongside other prominent operatives in the courtyard of a Sipah madrasah in Jhang. 104 Tariq was allowed a year before his death to stand in the 2002 election from prison. He was released after winning a seat in parliament despite the fact that there were non-bailable warrants out against him on terrorism-related charges. 105 Sanaullah concluded his deal with ASWJ after Riaz Basra, a founder of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the even more militant Sipah offshoot, and a former fighter in Afghanistan who was sentenced to death for the assassination of the director of an Iranian cultural centre, allegedly masterminded a failed attempt to assassinate Sharif. Basra accused the Sharif government of having been influenced by Iran.
Chaudhry Abid Raza Gujjar, an alleged Lashkar-e-Jhangvi associate and assassin, 106 
Two Peas in a Pod
Khan's backing of the blasphemy law has served as a ramming rod against minorities, a means to whip crowds into a frenzy, and at times, even turn them into lynch mobs and inspire vigilante killings.
Shortly after Khan's election, Butt, the South Asian scholar, noted that "Khan's ideology and beliefs on a host of dimensions are indistinguishable from the religious hard-right." 113 
Subverting the System from Within
Pakistan's military argues that mainstreaming of militants serves a national interest. It amounts to "a combination of keeping control over important national matters like security, defense and foreign policy, but also giving these former militant groups that have served the state a route into the mainstream where their energies can be utilized," a senior military official said. 133 The military's strategy is not without risks for China that, in contrast to its South Asian ally, has adopted an iron fist approach in dealing with dissent of its own, particularly in the troubled north- If critics are to be believed, China has little to fear. The military's strategy is bound to fail, the critics say. "Incorporating radical Islamist movements into formal political systems may have some benefits in theory …. But the structural limitations in some Muslim countries with prominent radical groups make it unlikely that these groups will adopt such reforms, at least not anytime soon …. While
Islamabad wants to combat jihadist insurgents in Pakistan, it also wants to maintain influence over groups that are engaged in India and Afghanistan," said Kamran Bokhari, a well-known scholar of violent extremism. 136 Citing the example of a militant Egyptian group that formed a political party to participate in elections, Bokhari argued that "though such groups remain opposed to democracy in theory, they are willing to participate in electoral politics to enhance their influence over the state. Extremist groups thus become incorporated into existing institutions and try to push radical changes from within the system."
Bokhari didn't need to cast his glance beyond Pakistan's borders. The streets of Islamabad in late 2017 and the city's High Court told a similar story. A sit-in led by Rizvi that blocked a key Islamabad traffic artery and propelled his movement toward a political party forced then-law minister Zahid
Hamid to resign after he was accused of altering an electoral oath declaring the prophet Muhammad as God's final prophet. 137 In a ruling months before the 2018 election, controversial Islamabad High Court judge Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui ordered parliament to "take measures which can completely terminate those who scar this belief." Referring to the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat principle, Siddique further ruled that it should be mandatory for anyone joining the judiciary, armed forces, civil service, or other government jobs. 138 A year earlier, Siddiqui defined blasphemers as terrorists in a case related to the kidnapping and abuse by unidentified men allegedly tied to ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency, of five bloggers because of their criticism of the military and supposedly blasphemous writings. 139 The case petitioned the court to ban social media pages, including those of the five bloggers, that contained derogatory posts about Islam and Prophet Muhammad. 140 The issue was so emotional that Siddiqi broke down in tears during each of the case's three court hearings.
"This is complete surrender to hardline Islamists. It's a sad day for Pakistan: it shows that the state is so weak, and that we can't stand up to blackmailing," said political analyst and journalist Zahid
Hussain. 141 The sit-in and the elections were two ways of mainstreaming militants, some of whom, according to Pakistani police, have taken jobs as drivers, cleaners, guards, cobblers, and garbage collectors as cover to carry out reconnaissance of potential targets, transport weapons and explosives, and launch attacks. 142 The TLP's success and Siddiqi's ruling serve as examples of how militants can potentially reshape the political landscape of a nuclear-armed Muslim country of 208 million people with their antiWestern rhetoric and calls for ever-stricter interpretation of Shari'ah even if they falter in elections.
"The ostensible attempt to mainstream the religious right-wing is not making these parties take relatively moderate positions. But rather, it's radicalizing the mainstream," said Saroop Ijaz, a lawyer for Human Rights Watch. 143 In an editorial published on the eve of the election, Dawn warned that none of the militants who ran for office had renounced the politics of hate and violence, putting a question mark over the state's counterterrorism strategy. "If extremists are allowed to contest for seats and make it to the legislatures without renouncing violence, what is to be made of NAP's goal three which states that 'militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country'? What good is banning organisations when they reappear with new names, and when militant leaders run for office? As for political parties courting extremists for votes, they should realise that should the hardliners get their way, the whole democratic edifice will be wrapped up and replaced with something much darker," the newspaper said, referring to the government's anti-terrorist National Action Plan (NAP). 144
Some PML-N and PPP members of the Senate warned in the run-up to the election that allowing militants to run risked Pakistan's next parliament including deputies who refuse to recognize the legislative's institutional supremacy. "Be afraid of the day when these people will be sitting in this house," warned PML-N senator Pervaiz Rasheed. 145 Speaking to Dawn in the run-up to the 2018 election, TLP leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi appeared to confirm Rasheed's worst fears. "Democracy will be subservient to Islam, of course. What sort of an Islamic system is this where the Shariah court is subservient to the Supreme Court?" Rizvi said.
Envisioning a top-down system, Rizvi asserted that "power always comes from the top. You cannot make a clerk pious and ask him to hold someone senior to him accountable for theft. It doesn't work that way." By implication, Rizvi appeared to suggest that the use of force was justified to achieve his Hasan attempted to get a man jailed without trial for converting to Shi'ism, police officers acknowledged that conversion was not a crime but that they had to detain him for some time to avoid protests. 149 Similarly, Sunni-Shi'ite couples in Jhang are ostracized. "People are taught that whoever kills a Shiite, will get a virgin in heaven," Al-Hasan, a tall man with a carefully cropped beard and curly hair, said. Waseem Abbas, a former Shi'ite militant-turned-liberal and political science graduate whose uncle was sentenced to death for killing Sipah founder Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, said he was afraid to publicly express an opinion. "I voice my opinions only in closed circles of friends and family," Abbas said. 150
Class Struggle Cloaked in Sectarianism
In May 2018, Pakistan's National Commission for Human Rights reported that 509 Hazaras had been killed since 2013. 151 Many of those killings were laid at the doorstep of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a violent group that split from Sipah/ASWJ but, according to a founding member of Sipah, still has close ties to the mother organisation. 152 ASWJ denies that it is still linked to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a group that graduated from a small town sectarian militia into a pillar of Pakistani militancy and a backbone of its evolution.
The question is, said Pakistani political commentator Mosharraf Zaidi, "how did Lashkar-e-Jhangvi To achieve its goal, Sipah openly advocated violence and incited riots in various Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Multan, Kabirwala, Peshawar, and Jhang, the latter of which is characterised by
Jamat-e-Islami, Pakistan's oldest and most established Islamist party founded by Islamist scholar Abul Ala Maudud that was the first of its kind to develop an ideology based on the modern revolutionary conception of Islam. 168 "Religion was only a pretext as anti-Shia rhetoric proved to be a powerful means of mobilization in the mid-1980s and also way to get support both from state and from foreign sources," said Abou
Zahab. 169 The teachers and doctors argued that Pakistani and Saudi Sunni Muslim ultraconservatives exploited the fact that powerful Shi'ite businessmen, or the "feudals" in their words, whose wealth initially stemmed from large landholdings, dominate Jhang's predominantly agricultural economy. Many in Jhang agree with their assertion that the feudals had deliberately kept the region among Pakistan's more underdeveloped in a bid to maintain their grip on power. Empowerment allowed militant clerics and businessmen associated with them to operate as vote banks. Their popularity was based on the services they provided, including free boarding and meals for students at their seminaries which provided economic relief to impoverished families as well as the resolution of marital and water-sharing disputes. Their credibility and ability to recruit was enhanced by backing up their sermons with threats of violence. 178 During a recruitment drive in 2014, ASWJ signed up some 50,000 new members in the province of Sindh that long prided itself on its diversity and tolerance. The drive benefitted from the fact that ASWJ had established an estimated 4,000 madrasahs in the province. "We give them a religious education. We feed and house them and provide them a bursary that goes to their families. We even pay for their medical expenses. We take better care of the students than even their own parents," said an ASWJ spokesman. 179 Journalists Huma Yusuf and Syed Shoaib Hasan concluded, in a United States Institute of Peace report, that "these leaders have growing local networks among politicians and police, which landowners are increasingly unable to match. They are also able to enhance their credibility by emphasizing the Islamic correctness of their decisions." 180 Their popularity and ability to deliver votes enhanced their value to established political parties eager to benefit from their grassroots strength. Ramazan Mengal became the alleged conduit for large amounts of Saudi money that poured into militant madrasahs or religious seminaries that dot Balochistan. 189 The funds, despite the fact that it was not clear whether they were government or private monies, and if they were private whether the donations had been tacitly authorized, were widely seen as creating building blocks for a possible Saudi effort to destabilize Iran by fomenting ethnic unrest among the Baloch on the Iranian side of the Pakistani border.
A potential Saudi effort, possibly backed by the United States, would complicate an already difficult security situation in Balochistan, home to the port of Gwadar, which is a key node in China's massive investment in Pakistan and has witnessed attacks on Chinese targets. It would risk putting Saudi and Chinese interests at odds and upset Pakistan's applecart, built on efforts to pacify Balochistan, while not allowing its longstanding close ties to the kingdom to strain relations with its Iranian neighbour.
